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IS THIS A PUBLIC LAW CASE? 
Andrew S Butler* 
This article is a revised and updated version of a paper presented at the New Zealand Law 
Society Intensive on Public Law in September 1998.  In it, Andrew Butler demonstrates the breadth 
of the concept of "public law" by investigating the application provision of the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990 and the field of activity susceptible to public law judicial review.  He concludes 
that nowadays a public law case can arise in settings (such as the formulation of common law 
private law, the interpretations of statutory private law, commercial contracts of public entities, 
regulatory acts of private bodies) far removed from those traditionally thought of as public law ones. 
I INTRODUCTION 
Is this a Public Law Case?  Such a seemingly simple question, yet one which is very 
difficult to answer.  One of the prime reasons for this difficulty is that our notions of public 
law and its analogue, private law, are poorly developed.  To many of us, the basic working 
concept is that private law is the law of torts, contracts, restitution, equity and so on, with 
a primary (though far from exclusive) focus on monetary remedies, while public law is 
constitutional and administrative law with a primary focus on the remedies related to 
judicial review.1  Yet a moment's reflection will indicate that even as a working concept 
this view is flawed.2   
For example, the tort liability of public authorities, while analysed within the 
framework of the "private law" of tort, is significantly shaped by public law 
  
*  Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law, Victoria University of Wellington, and currently of the Crown 
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Gully Buddle Weir, Wellington (where he was Law Faculty Research Fellow, 1998-1999) in the 
preparation of the original paper, and Janet McLean for her comments on an earlier version of the 
paper.  Thanks are also due to the New Zealand Law Society for permission to reproduce large 
parts of the paper originally prepared for the Society's Public Law Intensive in September 1998. 
1 See G Hogan and D Morgan Administrative Law in Ireland (2 ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1991) 
319. 
2 Hogan and Morgan, above n 1, 319 note that private law applies in appropriate contexts to 
government. 
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considerations.3  In contract law, similar developments are underway: there appears to be 
emerging in New Zealand a public law of tendering while overseas a complex interaction 
between fiduciary duties, contract and public regulatory law is occurring in the financial 
services sector.4  In relation to equity, chapters are beginning to appear in textbooks 
reflecting the fact that though government is affected by rules and principles of equity, the 
application of those rules and principles is so affected by the public law context that 
separate treatment is required.5  Thus, it is fair to say that there is within the heartland of 
private law, a public law of negligence, a public law of contract, a public law of equity.  In 
the other direction, however, "private law" appears to have invaded the realm of public 
law.6  Thus, while the authors of the chapter in McGechan on Procedure on the Judicature 
Amendment Act have argued that "an implicit requirement in section 4(1) [of the 1972 Act 
as amended] is the presence of some public element" they have had to accept that "New 
Zealand cases may be found which are inconsistent with this analysis" including cases 
concerning the implication of natural justice rights into the contractual or similar 
arrangements of domestic bodies.7 
Bearing in mind the lack of success of other commentators in rendering a wholly 
satisfactory definition of public law, I hope that I will be forgiven if I adopt a rather 
simple, rough and ready, framework within which to discuss the question, Is this a Public 
Law Case?  What I want to do is concentrate on determining in what circumstances we can 
say that a particular case is such that public law considerations operate so as to influence 
the substantive content of the law which is to govern.  Due to limitations of space I have 
decided that we can take it that public law considerations will be involved if the case is 
  
3 See M Allars "Tort and Equity Claims Against the State" in P D Finn (ed) Essays on Law and 
Government Vol 2 The Citizen and the State in the Courts (Law Book Company, Sydney, 1996) ch 3; J 
Doyle and J Redwood "The Common Law Liability of Public Authorities:  the Interface between 
Public and Private Law" [1999] Tort L Rev 30; R Harrison, "'Converting it into Cash:' 
Compensation and Damages in Public Law" in NZLS Public Law Intensive 1998 (NZLS, Wellington, 
1998); S Kneebone Tort Liability of Public Authorities (Law Book Company, Sydney, 1998) especially 
ch 1. 
4 See J Beatson "The Relationship between the Regulations Governing the Financial Services 
Industry and Fiduciary Duties under the General Law" in E McKendrick (ed) Commercial Aspects of 
Trusts and Fiduciary Obligations (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992). 
5 See G Dal Pont and D Chalmers Equity and Trusts in Australia and New Zealand (Law Book 
Company, Sydney, 1996) ch 4; A S Butler "Equity & Public Law" in A S Butler (ed) Equity & Trusts 
in New Zealand (Brooker's, Wellington, forthcoming); Allars, above n 3. 
6  See also D Oliver "Common Values in Public and Private Law and the Public/Private Divide" 
[1997] PL 630. 
7 Hon Robert McGechan (ed) McGechan on Procedure (Brookers, Wellington, 1988) para JA4.04 
(updated 7 November 1997). 
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one which is subject to the Bill of Rights and/or the subject of public law judicial review.  
The rest of this paper is aimed at determining when a case is subject to the Bill of Rights 
and/or the subject of public law judicial review.  The approach will be principally 
doctrinal, as opposed to theoretical (though, of course, theory will have a role to play) with 
the aim of demonstrating what sorts of cases in your practice are likely to be ones in which 
public law considerations will be relevant. 
As we shall see, in some circumstances public law considerations will be implicated 
because of the identity of the actor, while in others the focus will rather be on the 
underlying nature of the function, power, duty and so on which is in issue.  And these two 
need not be mutually exclusive. 
At a general level we should not be surprised that the trigger for "Public Law" may 
take the form of both the identity of the actor (often referred to as the "source" test) and the 
nature of the power, duty or function (the "function" test).  On the one hand, governmental 
institutions are regarded differently from private persons (legal or natural).  More 
particularly, in the modern age the standards of propriety and accountability which are 
demanded of government are often much higher than those demanded of private persons.  
Government is meant to be a model citizen in all its activities.  At the same time though, 
there is a greater reticence to restrict governmental freedom to manoeuvre, at the policy 
level at least, in the belief that that will only reduce responsiveness to the electorate.  For 
both reasons, the identity of the actor (is it a public/governmental institution or a private 
one?) is obviously a significant issue in determining what standards it must adhere to.  On 
the other hand, the need for a functional test is also obvious.  Functions which are carried 
on for the benefit of and/or in the interests of the public (and one has to admit that the 
meaning of these phrases is inexact) and which are of a particular public importance 
(either intrinsically, or because of the way in which they are supplied or made available to 
the public for example monopoly, oligopoly, and so on, or both) should be governed by 
the same set of standards irrespective of the identity of the actor.  The processes of 
corporatisation, privatisation and contracting-out have forced public lawyers to 
rediscover8 the importance of the nature of the function as a core aspect of public law, 
reminding us that, in relation to some activities, public law should have an input 
regardless of the identity of the actor.9 
  
8 I say rediscover, because even before the advent of big government, the law had recognised in 
various ways that functions which affected the public interest required a special set of standards 
not generally required of private law.  See for example the law of common carriers. 
9  A similar sentiment is expressed by Lord Woolf of Barnes "Droit Public—English Style" [1995] PL 
57, 63-64. 
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Two final points.  First, one important theme of this paper is that the scope of public 
law properly extends well beyond the traditional scope associated with judicial review.  In 
particular, in exploring the application of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act I have 
attempted to underscore the point that public law has much to say about many aspects of 
the substantive rules of private law, be they found in statute or common law. 
Second, answering the question, Is this a Public Law case? merely satisfies an initial 
threshold question.  It is designed to determine whether public law standards may 
legitimately be brought to bear on the analysis of the case: it does not necessarily 
determine the exact content of those standards.  No doubt being able to say that a case is a 
public law case will assist in narrowing down the options or in indicating the likely type of 
standards.  But the intensity of those standards will be determined by reference to the 
individual circumstances, the gravity of the issue and the nature of the decision-maker.10  
With this background in mind, let us attempt to analyse what cases fall within the 
ambit of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 and of public law judicial review. 
II THE NEW ZEALAND BILL OF RIGHTS ACT 1990 
Most lawyers would readily accept that the Bill of Rights is a public law document,11 
setting standards to govern the activities of government and those bodies performing 
public functions.  Yet as we shall see presently, a full consideration of the application 
provision of the Bill of Rights indicates that "public law" has a very wide ambit and, 
ironically, is of direct relevance to significant parts of private law. 
  
10 See Electoral Commission v Cameron [1997] 2 NZLR 421, 430 (CA); Waitakere City Council v Lovelock 
[1997] 2 NZLR 385, 403  per Thomas J, 419 per Blanchard J (CA); R v Secretary of State for the Home 
Dept, ex p Bugdaycay [1987] 1 All ER 940, 952 per Lord Bridge (HL).  See also J Hodder, 
"'Irrationality': a Synonym Too Far" in NZLS Public Law Intensive 1998 (NZLS, Wellington, 1998).  
This point is helpfully discussed in Wandsworth LBC v A [2000] 1 WLR 1246 (CA) where it was 
held that a parent has a public law right not to be excluded from school grounds without the 
observance of natural justice.  Buxton LJ for the Court of Appeal warned (at 1253-1254) against the 
heresy 
that once a case is found to fall into the category of "public law" duty, that duty must 
be of the same nature and intensity in any case where public law is engaged. …"[T]he 
actual terms of [natural justice duties], and in particular the duty to hear submissions, 
will be strongly affected by the nature of the public body and the demands of the 
public work that it performs". 
11  Certainly a key feature of the Court of Appeal's decision in Baigent's Case (Simpson v Attorney-
General)  [1994] 3 NZLR 667 (CA) that compensation could be claimed for a violation of the Bill of 
Rights and was not barred by s 6(5) of the Crown Proceedings Act 1950 immunity from tort was 
that the Bill of Rights is a "public law" document: 677 per Cooke P, 691 per Casey J, 718 per McKay 
J. 
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A The Application Provision 
Section 3 of the Bill of Rights Act reads: 
3  Application—This Bill of Rights applies only to acts done— 
(a) By the legislative, executive, or judicial branches of the government of New 
Zealand; or 
(b) By any person or body in the performance of any public function, power, or duty 
conferred or imposed on that person by or pursuant to law. 
1 Section 3(a) 
Let us examine section 3(a) first.  By that sub-section, acts of the legislative, executive 
and judicial branches of the government of New Zealand fall within the scope of Bill of 
Rights scrutiny.  A number of points should be made about this provision.   
(a) Section 3(a) captures outputs as well as processes 
The first point to be made about section 3(a) is that the processes and procedures of the 
three branches referred to are intended to be regulated by the Bill of Rights: they are acts 
of those institutions and also provide the framework within which other acts of those 
institutions take place.  But the Bill of Rights extends much further, governing the output of 
each of the three institutions.  Thus, section 3(a) governs not only Parliamentary 
proceedings,12 but also the content of legislation.13  Similarly, the content of executive acts 
such as circulars, policies, and individual executive acts as well as the processes of the 
executive fall within the scope of the Bill of Rights.  Finally, by the same reasoning, not 
only the way in which courts (and tribunals) conduct themselves must meet the requisite 
Bill of Rights standards,14 but so also must the output of the courts in the course of 
adjudicating upon disputes, including naturally the rules of the common law.   
  
12 P A Joseph "Constitutional Law" [1997] NZ L Rev 209, 225-226 sets out the relevant material.  See 
also D McGee Parliamentary Practice in New Zealand (2  ed, G P Publications, Wellington, 1994) 505-
506. 
13 If it were otherwise, there would hardly be a need for the statement in s 4 of the Bill of Rights that 
enactments which are inconsistent with the Bill of Rights prevail notwithstanding inconsistency 
with the Bill of Rights, nor for the s 7 procedure under which the Attorney-General must report to 
Parliament on Bills which are inconsistent with the Bill of Rights. 
14 For example, a number of the fair trial rights guarantees are directed at the judicial process in 
criminal trials: see for example ss 24(b), 25 and 26.  In A v Attorney-General Employment Court, 
WC 1/00, 21 January 2000, 9 Goddard CJ recognised that in determining whether to order name 
suppression, the Employment Court was subject to the Bill of Rights by virtue of s 3(a) of the Bill 
of Rights. 
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(b) Scope of action caught by section 3(a) greater than that caught by section 3(b) 
Second, in my opinion, the purport of section 3(a) is that all acts of the three branches 
of government are caught.  Thus, in all of the activities of those institutions, from 
employment policies to core public tasks and functions, the Bill of Rights is a presence.  
This view is confirmed by a reading of section 3(b).  Section 3(b) extends the Bill of Rights 
to persons or bodies in the performance of any public function.  Hence, a body caught by 
section 3(b) would have to adhere to the Bill of Rights in performing whatever public 
function it had.  Yet outside that field (for example its internal organisation, employment 
practices, and so on) the Bill of Rights is not directly relevant.15  The reverse must be true 
for those caught by section 3(a).   
Moreover, this view of section 3(a) corresponds with the approach adopted by the 
Supreme Court of Canada under section 32(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms.  While that provision does not have the two limbs of section 3, the Supreme 
Court has developed a jurisprudence under which it distinguishes between entities which 
are governmental in character and those which though private may be subject to the 
Charter if used to implement specific governmental programmes.  In the recent Eldridge 
case, the Court reaffirmed its prior jurisprudence that, "when an entity is determined to be 
part of the fabric of government, the Charter will apply to all its activities, including those 
which might in other circumstances be thought of as 'private'"16 whereas when the entity 
is private it will only be subject to the Charter in relation to those of its activities (if any) 
which implement specific governmental programmes (this was the position of the 
hospitals the acts of which were impugned in Eldridge).  
  
15 To similar effect see P Rishworth "The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990: The First Fifteen 
Months" in Essays on the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (Auckland, Legal Research Foundation, 
1992) 18.  Note, however, that I disagree with Rishworth's view that the purpose of s 3(b) "is 
plainly to assist in the difficult task of explicating the term 'executive branch' in s 3(a)."  In my 
view, s 3(b) has the separate role of isolating the acts of those persons or bodies not caught by s 
3(a), which occur in the performance of a public function.  In this way s 3(b) may be a 
supplementary aid to the interpretation of s 3(a), but it is clearly more than that.  In their article, 
"Section 3 of the Bill of Rights" [1997] NZLJ 251, 254, Paul Radich and Richard Best also contest 
Rishworth's view.   
16 Eldridge v Attorney-General of British Columbia (1997) 3 BHRC 137, 153.  See also Wijetunga v 
Insurance Corporation of Sri Lanka [1985] LRC (Const) 335 (statutory corporation held to be 
emanation of government and disciplinary action aimed at curbing employee's free expression 
susceptible to constitutional review). 
 IS THIS A PUBLIC LAW CASE? 753 
 
(c) Defining "the executive"  
Third, in light of the extent to which the scope of application of the Bill of Rights hinges 
on whether an entity is caught by section 3(a) or section 3(b), the definition of "the 
executive" for the purposes of section 3(a) has no small importance. 
The Supreme Court of Canada has been keen to emphasise that this issue must be 
answered by reference to substance and form, not form alone.  Thus, an entity outside the 
usual departmental structure will not necessarily escape classification as part of the 
executive.17  The rationale for this approach is that "government should not be permitted 
to evade their Charter responsibilities by implementing policy through the vehicle of 
private arrangements."18 
The approach in Canada has been to determine whether the entity is "an emanation of 
government".19  Relevant indicia are whether the entity is under the routine and regular 
control of the Crown; the extent of its autonomy from government in running its affairs 
and setting its direction; the appointment of its directors/board and so on.  Interestingly, 
extensive regulation and funding by government has not been regarded as a sufficient 
basis to classify an entity as an emanation of government if the entity remains essentially 
autonomous.20  Thus, in the university and college cases, the Supreme Court closely 
examined the factual and legal matrix of control and direction in determining whether 
employment policies of such bodies were governed by the Charter.21 
  
17  See also Agarwal v Gurgaon Gramin Bank AIR (1988) SC 286 (IndSC) (regional rural bank held to be 
instrumentality of the state and its employment practices had to be conducted in accordance with 
constitutional fair procedures).  See also Gunaratne v People's Bank [1987] LRC (Const) 383, 396 
(SriLSC). 
18 Eldridge v Attorney-General of British Columbia above n 16, 153. 
19 Eldridge v Attorney-General of British Columbia above n 16, 152. 
20 Thus, in the hospital case (Stoffman v Vancouver General Hospital [1990] 3 SCR 483 (SCC)) and the 
university cases (McKinney v University of Guelph [1990] 3 SCR 229 (SCC) and Harrison v University 
of British Columbia [1990] 3 SCR 451 (SCC)), the Supreme Court found that notwithstanding 
extensive funding support for their activities the defendant institutions were not part of 
government for the purposes of s 32.  Note though that in Eldridge the Supreme Court made it 
clear that acts of these institutions to the extent that they gave effect to specific governmental 
programmes would be caught by the Charter. 
21 Thus, in Douglas/Kwantlen Faculty Association v Douglas College [1990] 3 SCR 570 and Lavigne v 
Ontario Public Service Employees Union [1991] 2 SCR 211 the Supreme Court held that collective 
employment agreements were subject to Charter review because the colleges involved in those 
cases were so much under the control and direction of the Crown as to be emanations of 
government.  By way of contrast, see the conclusions reached in McKinney v University of Guelph, 
above n 20. 
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In New Zealand, there has been little appreciation of the different scope of application 
between section 3(a) and section 3(b), hence little useful analysis of the meaning of the 
"executive" for Bill of Rights purposes22 and, as an inevitable result, confused case law.  
For example, one would have thought that the acts of law enforcement officials such as 
police and traffic officers would be regarded as core executive functions. Yet, in several 
cases, the Bill of Rights has been held to apply through section 3(b), not 3(a).23  Indicative 
of the confusion on the difference between sections 3(a) and 3(b) in this area is that the 
same judge — Richardson P — has held in one case that the acts of police officers are 
caught by section 3(b), and in a later case, by section 3(a)!24 
On the case law to date, a narrower view of "the executive" appears to prevail in New 
Zealand than in Canada.  In Federated Farmers v New Zealand Post (the Rural Delivery Fee 
case)25 McGechan J was required to determine whether an increase in the rural delivery 
fee (RDF) was an interference with rural dwellers' freedom of expression contrary to 
section 14 of the Bill of Rights.  In holding that New Zealand Post (NZP) was caught by 
section 3, his honour stated: 
The threshold question is whether NZP falls within section 3.  I would not necessarily regard it 
as part of the "executive" branch of the "government of New Zealand" within section 3(a), 
given the context provided by section 3(b).  The question more naturally arises under section 
3(b) itself.   
While going on to hold that New Zealand Post was indeed caught by section 3(b), it is 
implicit in McGechan J's view that once a body is located outside the departmental 
structure then the most natural way of determining its applicability is to have recourse to 
section 3(b).  This is counter to the Canadian position.26  Moreover, it results in a quite 
narrow meaning being given to the notion of "the executive".  It allows the simple 
expedient of corporatisation to reduce the range of conduct subject to Bill of Rights 
  
22  When the issue comes to be examined, the Court of Appeal's valuable analysis (in the non-Bill of 
Rights setting of tax law) in CIR v Medical Council of New Zealand [1997] 2 NZLR 297 (CA) the 
meaning of the phrase "instrument of the Executive Government" will require consideration. 
23  See Littlejohn v Ministry of Transport [1990-92] 1 NZBORR 285, 299 (HC); Noort v MOT; Curran v 
Police [1992] 3 NZLR 260, 282 per Richardson J (CA); Simpson v Attorney-General [Baigent's case] 
[1994] 3 NZLR 667, 714 per Gault J (CA). 
24  Noort v MOT above n 23, 282 (s 3(b)) and R v N [1999] 1 NZLR 713, 718 (s 3(a)). 
25 Federated Farmers v New Zealand Post [1990-92] 3 NZBORR 339 (HC). 
26 Thus, in Rural Dignity of Canada v Canada Post Corp (1991) 78 DLR (4th) 211, 224-225 it was held 
that CPC, a Crown Corporation, was part of government, with reference made to its being an 
agent of the Crown, its being subject to Ministerial direction and its historical status as a 
governmental department. 
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scrutiny.  Nonetheless, most later cases appear to have followed McGechan J's lead, 
analysing impugned acts of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and similar enterprises under 
section 3(b) rather than 3(a).27  (These cases will be considered later under section 3(b).) 
A possible exception is M v Palmerston North Boys High School.28  There, Goddard J in 
the course of determining that acts related to the private boarding residence of the 
defendant school were not caught by the Bill of Rights, referred to section 3(a) as applying 
to:29 
acts done directly by one of the three branches of Government, or, arguably, to the acts of an 
agent of one of the three branches of Government where there is evidence of a close and direct 
relationship of agency. 
While leaving the issue open, if correct, Goddard J's notion of "agency" envisages a 
broader scope for section 3(a), addressing itself to the realities of the myriad ways and 
forms in, and through, which modern government acts.   
Under Her Honour's analysis it may well be open to hold that an SOE such as New 
Zealand Post falls within the notion of agency and is thus caught by section 3(a).  After all, 
the Privy Council in New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General (the Broadcasting Assets 
case)30 said of an SOE that while "structured so that it is separate from the Crown ... it 
remains very much the Crown's creature."  Moreover, the Privy Council examined in some 
detail the involvement of the Crown in SOEs and concluded that "the Crown can exercise a  
 
  
27  For example, in Innes v Wong (No 2) (1996) 4 HRNZ 247, 248 (HC) Cartwright J implicitly defined 
the scope of s 3(a) as embracing the Crown or those for whose actions the Crown has direct 
responsibility.  On this approach, the activities of Crown Health Enterprises were held to be 
caught by s 3(b) rather than by s 3(a) of the Bill of Rights. 
28 M v Palmerston North Boys High School (1996) 3 HRNZ 515 (HC). 
29 M v Palmerston North Boys High School above n 28, 532-533 (emphasis added). 
30 New Zealand  Maori Council v Attorney-General  [1994] 1 NZLR 513, 520 (PC). 
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substantial degree of indirect control over the manner in which [SOE] assets are 
employed."31   
(d) Common law private law governed by the Bill of Rights 
Let us concentrate now on acts of the judicial branch.   
At the outset it needs to be reaffirmed that "The Judges speak and act on behalf of the 
community."32  They have been entrusted with substantial power, backed up by the 
coercive authority of the state, to be exercised in the Sovereign's name and on our behalf.  
It is only proper then that judicial activity be subject to the same strictures as to processes 
and outputs as the other two branches of government.  And this explains why our drafters 
explicitly included the judicial branch of the government of New Zealand in the section 
3(a) limb of the Bill of Rights. 
Turning to the case law, as regards the general point that the judiciary is bound to give 
effect to the Bill of Rights in relation to its output, the words of Cooke P in Baigent's case 
are apposite:33 
Section 3 [of the Bill of Rights] also makes it clear that the Act applies to acts done by the 
Courts.  The Act is binding on us, and we would fail in our duty if we did not give an effective 
remedy to a person whose legislatively affirmed rights have been infringed. 
The importance of this statement lies in its acknowledgement that it is not the presence 
of government before the court as one of the parties to the litigation (in Baigent's case the 
Attorney-General) which makes the Bill of Rights applicable; rather the Bill of Rights 
  
31 M v Palmerston North Boys High School above n 28, 520. Moreover, while recent cases such as Te 
Heu Heu v Attorney-General [1998] NZAR 337 (HC) might be regarded by some as proof that an 
SOE is not to equated with the Crown, it is important to recall that Robertson J stated in that case 
(at 358): 
There is no one rule or principle which can be applied to determine whether an entity 
should be regarded as an agent for the Crown.  Rather, the answer will depend in each 
case on a full assessment of the words of the legislation in the context in which the issue 
arises, and the nature of the power being exercised by the body or the rights or privileges 
being sought. 
Thus the decision that Landcorp was not part of the Crown for the purposes of the Crown's Treaty 
of Waitangi responsibilities does not govern the issue of whether SOEs for the very different 
purpose of the application of the Bill of Rights might not be thought of as Crown agents. 
32  Broadcasting Corporation of New Zealand v Attorney-General [1982] 1 NZLR 120, 122  per Woodhouse 
P (CA).  See also O'Connor v Police [1990-92] 1 NZBORR 259, 271 (HC) where Thomas J used the 
same words. 
33 Baigent's Case above n 23, 676. 
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applies because adjudication is an act of the judicial branch of government.  In short, 
adjudication by a court or tribunal is a sufficient trigger to activate the Bill of Rights.34 
Since a large part of the courts' adjudicatory jurisdiction covers private law disputes,35 
through section 3 of the Bill of Rights public law reaches into the heart of private law 
requiring the latter to reshape itself in light of relevant public law standards.  In this way, 
the Bill of Rights can be seen as public law's Trojan horse inside private law's city gates.   
Lange v Atkinson provides us with a recent example of this in the common law sphere.  
It will be recalled that former Prime Minister David Lange sued political scientist J B 
Atkinson and North & South magazine in relation to comments which he regarded as 
defamatory.  The defendants submitted that the common law of qualified privilege ought 
to be extended to protect untrue statements made by the press to the general public so 
long as those statements were not made with malice.  Both the High Court and Court of 
Appeal agreed with this submission.  At both levels section 14 of the Bill of Rights 
(freedom of expression) was a significant feature in favour of the development of the law 
  
34 To the contrary see the comments of Blanchard J in TVNZ Ltd v Newsmonitor Services Ltd [1994] 2 
NZLR 91, 96 (HC) who put the widest interpretation of s 3(a)'s reference to the judicial branch of 
government as requiring courts    
to conduct themselves in accordance with the Bill of Rights in terms of their processes and 
procedures, but that this direction does not extend to the substance of their judgments and 
the orders which flow out of those judgments. 
His honour opined that,  
If it was intended that the Bill of Rights is directly to apply in relation to every question of 
statutory interpretation and every other substantive judicial decision Parliament might 
have been expected to so enact in plain terms. 
With great respect this reasoning is illogical.  His honour is plainly wrong in suggesting that the 
Bill of Rights does not directly apply in relation to every question of statutory interpretation — s 6 
of the Bill of Rights, which requires the courts to give a meaning to enactments which is consistent 
with the Bill of Rights, and s 4 of the Bill of Rights which prevents the courts from invalidating or 
rendering ineffective any enactment, gives the lie to any contrary view.  Next, no one suggests 
that there has been a "failure" by Parliament to bind every administrative act of government 
through the Bill of Rights, merely because all that is referred to in s 3(a) is the executive.  If the 
phrase "the executive" is sufficient to cover all administrative acts, then surely the phrase "the 
judiciary" is sufficient to cover all judicial acts, including the common law.  Moreover, it should be 
noted that Blanchard J's judgment was delivered 8 months prior to Baigent's case, and is 
inconsistent with Lange v Atkinson discussed later. 
35  A point noted by (and clearly troubling to) Holland J in Police v Geiringer [1990-92] 1 NZBORR 331, 
343 (HC) when discussing the proper reach of s 3 of the Bill of Rights. 
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in the manner advanced by the defendants.  For our purposes the following statement of 
Elias J (as she then was) in the High Court is of great interest:36 
In my view, the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act protections are to be given effect by the Court 
in applying the common law.  ...  The application of the Act to the common law seems to me to 
follow from the language of section 3 which refers to acts of the judicial branch of the 
Government of New Zealand ... . 
This view was seemingly approved by the joint judgment of Richardson P, Henry, 
Keith and Blanchard JJ in the Court of Appeal.37 (In its recent judgment, the Privy Council 
did not address this issue.) 
The explicit reference to the judiciary in section 3(a), the inexorable logic of Cooke P's 
position in Baigent's case, and Elias J's view in Lange, makes the application of our Bill of 
Rights significantly different from the position in Canada.  There, the common law is not 
as of right38 subject to the Charter unless one of the parties to the litigation is a 
governmental entity. This position has been adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada to 
reflect the language of the application provision of the Canadian Charter (s 32(1)).  Section 
32(1) makes reference only to the legislature and executive; unlike section 3(a) of our Bill of 
Rights there is no reference to the judiciary.39  On this basis (as well as on the basis of a 
wariness to subject all of the common law to Charter scrutiny) in Canada a rule of the 
common law may be applied in litigation between two private parties notwithstanding an 
apparent conflict between the rule and a substantive Charter right.40   
  
36 Lange v Atkinson [1997] 2 NZLR 22, 32 (HC). 
37 Lange v Atkinson [1998] 3 NZLR 424, 451 (judgment of Richardson P, Henry, Keith, Blanchard JJ) 
(CA). 
38 See the discussion of Hill below n 41 as to the use of Charter values to inform the remoulding of 
the common law. 
39 This point was taken by Elias J in Lange v Atkinson above n 36, 32. 
40 The seminal case on this issue is Retail, Wholesale & Department Stores Union v Dolphin Delivery 
(1986) 33 DLR (4th) 176 (SCC) [Dolphin Delivery] where the union unsuccessfully attempted to 
challenge common law rules that regarded a secondary picket as amounting to the common law 
tort of inducing a breach of contract on the basis that the rules interfered with Charter rights of 
free expression. 
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While the position under our Bill of Rights might differ from that in Canada,41 it is in 
line with the position in a number of overseas jurisdictions, such as the United States,42  
South Africa43 and Ireland,44 and with the position which a number of commentators and  
 
  
41 It is important, though, to note that in reality the Canadian position is not as different from our 
position as may at first appear, hence my use of "may" and of the phrase "as of right" in describing 
the position under s 32(1).  For the Supreme Court has accepted that even in private litigation (that 
is litigation between two or more private persons) it is legitimate to use Charter values as a basis 
upon which to revisit and revise common law rules.  (See Dolphin Delivery above n 40 and Hill v 
Church of Scientology (1995) 126 DLR (4th) 129 (SCC) (defamation action where both parties 
private).)  Indeed, in light of this aspect of the Canadian jurisprudence, Elias J commented in Lange 
v Atkinson that even if the common law was not directly caught by the Bill of Rights (which she 
did not accept): 
The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 is important contemporary legislation which 
is directly relevant to the policies served by the common law of defamation.  It is idle 
to suggest that the common law need not conform to the judgments in such 
legislation.  They are authoritative as to where the convenience and welfare of society 
lies. 
Lange v Atkinson  above n 36, 32.  Note also that the judgment of Richardson P, Henry, Keith and 
Blanchard JJ in the Court of Appeal above n 37, 450-451 draws attention to this significant 
difference between the New Zealand Bill of Rights and the Canadian Charter. 
 Finally, I note (and agree with) the comments of Hutcheon JA in Bank of British Columbia v CBC 
(1995) 126 DLR (4th) 644, 672 (BCCA) to the effect that there is no meaningful distinction between 
the application of the Charter and the application of Charter values — either the Charter applies 
or it does not. 
42 See Shelly v Kraemar (1948) 334 US 1. 
43 See s 8 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (4 HRNZ 740-741).  Note that 
under the so-called interim Constitution of 1993, a majority of the Constitutional Court of South 
Africa in Du Plessis v De Klerk (1996) 5 BCLR 658; (1996) 3 SA 850 (SACC) (a defamation case) 
essentially adopted the Canadian position.  That position has been effectively reversed by s 8 of 
the 1996 Constitution. 
44 See JW v JW [1993] 2 IR 476 (IrSC) (common law rules related to dependent domicile inconsistent 
with equality between men and women) and see generally A S Butler "Constitutional Rights in 
Private Litigation: A Critique and Comparative Analysis" (1993) 22 Anglo-Amer L Rev 1 and A S 
Butler "Private Litigation and Constitutional Rights under sections 8 and 9 of the 1996 
Constitution — Assistance from Ireland" (1999) 116 SALJ 77. 
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judges expect to emerge under the recently enacted United Kingdom Human Rights Act 
1998.45 
In an article in the New Zealand Law Journal some years ago, I argued that the Bill of 
Rights applied to all common law litigation, but finished by agreeing with Paul Rishworth 
that due to the pervasive presence of statute in New Zealand and the regular updating of 
the common law by statute, it may well be that "there are very few instances of common 
law rules which could be impugned for inconsistency with the Bill of Rights".46  Thus, 
public law's Trojan horse may be thought not to have significant potential impact on 
private law.  This would be a false view to adopt. 
(e) Statutory private law governed by the Bill of Rights 
First, the sphere of private law which is subjected to the Bill of Rights extends well 
beyond rules of the common law which regulate private relationships.  Statute is subject to 
the Bill of Rights.  To the extent that legislative regimes govern interpersonal relationships 
they must adhere to public law standards.  Overseas, this has seen challenges to such 
aspects of private law governed by statute as limitation periods,47 rent control,48 evictions, 
anti-discrimination statutes49 and so on.  In a New Zealand context it is not open to parties 
to litigation to seek to strike down a statutory provision which interferes with their rights 
and freedoms — section 4 of the Bill of Rights prevents this.50  Nonetheless, if there is no 
express or necessarily implied inconsistency between the statute and the Bill of Rights, the 
  
45 See in particular s 6 of the Act which defines "public authority" (the application phrase) to include 
the courts, and the comments thereon by Lord Irvine of Lairg (the Lord Chancellor) 583 PD (HL) 
783 (24 November 1997); W Wade "The United Kingdom's Bill of Rights" in The University of 
Cambridge Centre for Public Law Constitutional Reform in the United Kingdom: Practice and 
Principles (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 1998) 62-63.  See, for a view contrary to that of Sir William 
Wade's, S Kentridge "The Incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights" in the 
same volume 70. 
46 A S Butler "The New Zealand Bill of Rights and private common law litigation" [1991] NZLJ 261, 
265. 
47 See O'Brien v Keogh [1972] IR 144 (IrSC); O'Brien v Manufacturing Engineering Ltd [1973] IR 334 
(IrSC); Moynihan v Greensmyth [1977] IR 55 (IrSC). 
48 Blake v Attorney-General [1982] IR 117 (IrSC). 
49 See Blainey v Ontario Hockey Association (1986) 26 DLR (4th) 728 (OntCA) and In re Art 26 of the 
Constitution and the Employment Equality Bill 1997 (1997) 4 BHRC 91 (IrSC). 
50  However, since the Court of Appeal's judgment in Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review 
(1999) 5 HRNZ 224 (CA) the possibility appears to exist for a party to obtain a declaration that a 
statute places an unjustified limitation on his/her rights contrary to s 5 of the Bill of Rights.  For 
more on this possibility, see A S Butler "Judicial Indications of Inconsistency – A New Weapon in 
the Bill of Rights Armoury?" [2000] NZ L Rev 43. 
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meaning most consistent with the Bill of Rights must be given (section 6 of the Bill of 
Rights). Thus, for example, section 14 of the Bill of Rights (freedom of expression) has been 
raised in at least two commercial cases between private parties:  P C Direct v Best Buy 
Ltd,51  and Cosco (NZ) Ltd v Port of Napier,52 and in proceedings under the Harassment Act 
1997: Beadle v Allen.53  Furthermore a recent law review article has persuasively argued 
that aspects of New Zealand copyright law may need revisiting in order to ensure a proper 
balance between property rights and free expression.54 
Moreover, the Bill of Rights will be relevant at the parliamentary stages of any 
legislation which governs private relationships.  Indeed, the extensive number of 
submissions contesting the exclusion of same-sex couples from the coverage of the De 
Facto Relationships (Property) Bill 1998 on the ground that it discriminated against gays 
and lesbians contrary to section 19(1) of the Bill of Rights serves to illustrate that even in 
such a paradigmatically private law field as family law, public law standards set a highly 
relevant benchmark. 
(f) Does the Bill of Rights require lacunae in private law to be plugged? 
Second, the courts have yet to determine whether gaps in private law, which leave a 
citizen without a remedy when another person interferes with a right or freedom 
contained in the Bill of Rights, represent "acts" of the judicial or legislative branches of 
government.  If the courts do accept such a proposition then public law will bring about 
significant developments within the field of private law. 
A concrete example may help understanding.  New Zealand law is still slowly 
evolving a tort of privacy.55  At present, a private person who is subjected to intrusive 
video or other surveillance has no remedy in tort.  One of the reasons for this is that the 
judges have failed to evolve the law in this direction.  Is this lacuna a judicial act for the 
purposes of  
 
  
51 P C Direct v Best Buy Ltd (1997) 7 TCLR 452, 462 (HC) where Elias J expressed her concern "not to 
cut across the rights to freedom of speech and to receive information protected by s 14 of the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990" in the context of an application for an interlocutory injunction in 
an action under ss 8 and 9 of the Trademarks Act 1953. 
52  Cosco (NZ) Ltd v Port of Napier (31 March 1999) unreported, High Court, Napier Registry, CP 7/99, 
15-16. 
53  Beadle v Allen (9 November 1999) unreported, High Court, Auckland Registry, AP42/98. 
54  J Oliver "Copyright, Fair Dealing, and Freedom of Expression" (2000) 19 NZULR 89. 
55 See generally J Burrows "Privacy" in S Todd (ed) The Law of Torts in New Zealand (2 ed, Brookers, 
Wellington, 1997) 955ff. 
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section 3(a)?56  If it is, and assuming that video surveillance is a "search" for the purposes 
of section 21 of the Bill of Rights (right not to be subjected to unreasonable search or 
seizure), how might an aggrieved citizen take action?  Presumably, the most satisfactory 
approach would be to assert the existence of a common law privacy cause of action in 
one's pleadings and use section 21 of the Bill of Rights as the basis for resisting any strike 
out application: would not a decision to grant the strike out application contravene Cooke 
P's warning in Baigent's case that "we would fail in our duty if we did not give an effective 
remedy to a person whose legislatively affirmed rights have been infringed"?57 
In this regard, the Court of Appeal's judgment in Sharma v ANZ Banking Group58 takes 
on an added significance.  In that case, the appellant sought to set aside a bankruptcy 
notice on the basis that in terms of section 19(1)(d) of the Insolvency Act 1967 he had a 
counterclaim against the respondent bank which exceeded the amount of the judgment 
debt which the bank had claimed against him.  This counterclaim was said to arise, inter 
alia, from the highhanded and contemptuous manner in which the bailiffs had exercised a 
writ of sale on behalf of the bank, allegedly indiscriminately seizing household 
possessions, a considerable number of which may not have belonged to the appellant but 
rather to his wife.  In dismissing the appeal on the pleadings, Cooke P for the Court made 
the following pregnant observation:59 
It is perhaps not inconceivable — we say no more — that if the appellant and his wife were to 
consolidate their proceedings and jointly sue the bank and others on an allegation of 
unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Bill of Rights (New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990, section 21) or infringement of their or their family's rights to privacy under 
the common law, some cause of action might be established.  
  
56 For discussion of this issue in relation to the UK Human Rights Act 1998 see J Coppel and S Ekins 
"Privacy and press freedom under the European Convention" [1998] Sol J 130, 131; M Hunt "The 
'Horizontal Effect' of the Human Rights Act" [1998] PL 423; I Leigh "Horizontal Rights, the Human 
Rights Act and Privacy: Lessons from the Commonwealth" (1999) 48 ICLQ 57; P Milmo "Human 
rights, privacy and the press" [1997] NLJ 1631. 
57 This would seem to be the position in South Africa and Ireland.  For South Africa see ss 8 and 9 of 
the 1996 Constitution above n 43.  For Ireland see Kennedy v Ireland [1987] IR 587 (IrHC) where a 
very substantial award of damages was made against the state for interference with the 
constitutional right to privacy (unlawful tapping of journalists' phones).  The Court gave this 
remedy notwithstanding the absence of a common law or statutory cause of action, on the basis 
that a failure to do so would be a failure to vindicate the plaintiffs' constitutional rights.  The case 
was cited by Hardie Boys J in Baigent's case above n 23, 702.  For the use of the Constitution to plug 
lacunae in the law between private parties see Conway v INTO [1991] 2 IR 305 (IrSC) (also referred 
to by Hardie Boys J in Baigent's case). 
58 Sharma v ANZ Banking Group [1990-92] 3 NZBORR 183 (CA). 
59 Sharma v ANZ Banking Group above n 58, 190. 
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Here is a clear suggestion that the Bill of Rights may well give rise to new causes of 
action per se, regardless of the identity of the parties to the litigation, and even in 
circumstances which might more traditionally be regarded as falling within the province 
of "private law". 
2 Section 3(b) 
Let us direct our attention now to section 3(b) of the Bill of Rights.  Recall that in terms 
of that subsection,  
3 Application—This Bill of Rights applies only to acts done— 
... 
(b) By any person or body in the performance of any public function, power, or duty 
conferred or imposed on that person by or pursuant to law. 
What is the intended scope of this provision?60   
We have already noted that in a number of judgments section 3(b) has been regarded 
as bringing within the purview of the Bill of Rights acts of publicly-owned companies such 
as SOEs and related organisations.  I have queried whether in fact it would not be more 
appropriate for such bodies to be regarded as part of the executive branch in terms of 
section 3(a) and hence bound in respect of all of their activities by the Bill of Rights.  But 
assuming arguendo that the present jurisprudence remains in place, which acts are caught 
by section 3(b)?61 
(a) Trading activities of SOEs and other Crown entities 
This has proven to be a vexing question.  First, it has been suggested that where an 
SOE engages in trading activities in a manner similar to comparable private businesses, 
section 3(b) does not apply because the impugned function, power or duty lacks a "public" 
dimension.  The argument is simply that powers which ordinary persons and legal entities 
enjoy cannot be "public" powers; and such powers cannot transmute into public ones just 
because the actor has a public, as opposed to private, character or identity.  If accepted, 
such a view would exempt the exercise of contractual and property rights by SOEs from 
Bill of Rights review.  The authorities on this issue are divided.   
  
60  In addition to the cases discussed below, I note that the Speaker of the House of Representatives is 
caught by s 3(b) when controlling access to Parliament grounds: Police v Beggs [1999] 3 NZLR 615, 
626 (HC, Full Ct).  This case does not impact upon the theme of this paper that public law applies 
to much private activity and is not discussed further. 
61  See also A Shaw "Drug Testing in the Workplace and the Bill of Rights" [1995] NZ L Rev 22, 59-61. 
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In TVNZ Ltd v Newsmonitor Services Ltd,62 Blanchard J opined that TVNZ's trading 
activities did not fall within the ambit of section 3(b).  While, with respect, His Honour's 
reasoning is not fulsome (reflecting the fact that the point was not fully argued) it seems 
clear that the reasoning for this holding was that there was nothing about the way in 
which TVNZ traded which distinguished it from any private business enterprise.  
Accordingly, there was nothing sufficiently special about its trading activities to indicate 
that those activities were done in the performance of a public function, power or duty.  In 
so concluding, Blanchard J relied on the then recent judgment of the Court of Appeal in 
Auckland Electric Power Board v ECNZ, which had held that ECNZ's contracts with its 
suppliers were private trading activities and so were not susceptible to judicial review.  
However, subsequent to Blanchard J's judgment the Privy Council overruled the Court of 
Appeal's reasoning on this point, holding that ECNZ's status as a public body was 
sufficient to render its contractual activities reviewable in principle (Mercury Energy v 
ECNZ).63  For this reason alone, it is submitted that Newsmonitor is not good law. 
Indeed, Blanchard J's approach was criticised by Williams J in Lawson v Housing New 
Zealand.64  In that case the plaintiff challenged Housing New Zealand's (HNZ) decision to 
move to a market rent policy on the ground, inter alia, that it was an interference with her 
right to life (section 8 of the Bill of Rights).  It was submitted for HNZ that the Bill of 
Rights did not apply.65  More specifically, section 3(b) did not apply because a rent 
increase was "a private function carried out by a landlord" not one done pursuant to 
statute.66  Williams J rejected this argument correctly holding that "the act done, the 
increasing of rent, does not need to be public provided it is done in the performance of a 
public function power or duty."67  In other words, the mechanism through which a public 
function, power or duty is implemented is not determinative of the application of section 
3(b); what is determinative is that that mechanism (even if it is one also resorted to by a 
non-public person or body) is being used so as to carry out a public function, power or 
duty conferred or imposed by law.   
  
62 TVNZ Ltd v Newsmonitor Services Ltd [1994] 2 NZLR 91 (HC). 
63 The Court of Appeal and Privy Council judgments are discussed in more detail in the Judicial 
Review section below. 
64 Lawson v Housing New Zealand (1996) 3 HRNZ 285 (HC). 
65 There does not appear to have been any discussion as to whether HNZ fell within s 3(a) of the Bill 
of Rights. 
66 Lawson v Housing New Zealand above n 64, 328. 
67 Lawson v Housing New Zealand above n 64, 329. 
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This must be correct.  It would not be right for the implementation of public functions 
to be exempt from Bill of Rights review through the simple device of contract.  This is 
more so the case where the contract is standard term or long term.68  (Where Williams J's 
analysis is in turn deficient is that he fails to explain what public function, power or duty 
HNZ was giving effect to when it determined to increase its tenants' rents.  Without this 
analysis, his decision that HNZ's acts "on balance" fell within section 3(b) is with respect 
suspect.) 
In the earlier case of Federated Farmers, McGechan J had also rejected the argument that 
section 3(b) did not apply to contracts entered into by New Zealand Post and its 
customers.  His Honour held that mail handling was a public function carried out in the 
public interest by an entity which, while technically a separate entity, was wholly owned 
and ultimately controlled by the Crown.  Moreover, the genesis of its functions lay in an 
assembly of statutes including the SOE Act itself and the Postal Services Act 1987.  The 
clear import of McGechan J's approach is that though New Zealand Post may interact with 
individual users of its services on a contractual basis, that contractual relationship with 
individuals does not detract from the statutory backdrop nor from the public nature of the 
function which it performs. 
(b) Private persons/entities and section 3(b) 
(i) Wholly private conduct outside section 3(b) … 
The Courts have emphasised a number of times that the Bill of Rights does not apply to 
all private activity — it only applies to those acts of private citizens or private entities 
which fall within the wording of section 3(b).  The result is that "[w]holly private conduct 
is left to be controlled by the general law of the land."69 
(ii) … but private identity of actor does not mean conduct outside  section 3(b) 
On the other hand, an important feature of Williams J's judgment in Lawson was His 
Honour's clear affirmation that for section 3(b) to be triggered it was not decisive that the 
particular body the acts of which are impugned "is essentially private in nature".70  What 
is determinative is whether, notwithstanding the entity's private character, it can be said to 
  
68 See in this regard the powerful obiter comments of Henchy J in McCord v Electricity Supply Board 
[1980] ILRM 153, 161-162 (IrSC) criticising aspects of the ESB's standard term electricity supply 
contract by reference to public law values (including constitutional rights).  His Honour likened 
the standard form contracts of a monopoly supplier of a vital public utility to a set of bylaws.  
Note that the ESB is, essentially, the Irish equivalent of an SOE. 
69  R v N above n 24, 718 (CA).  Of course, in its turn the general law of the land will be subject to the 
Bill of Rights through s 3(a). 
70 Lawson v Housing New Zealand above n 64, 329. 
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be performing a public function, power or duty.  Close attention will need to be paid, 
therefore, to the exact circumstances of the case and the constellation of statutory and 
common law rules which establish the framework within which the particular act or acts 
have occurred. 
(iii) Private persons and criminal investigations 
Thus, for example, the acts of an employee in searching, seizing and handing over to 
the police incriminating documents owned by his employer were not caught by section 
3(b), for the period that the initiative was being taken by the employee.  Once, however, 
the employee started taking directions from the investigating police officers, and hence 
acting in effect as their agent, section 3(b) was engaged.71 
Equally, whether acts of private citizens in arrest situations will be caught by the Bill of 
Rights depends on some quite fine shading.  In R v N the Court of Appeal stressed that for 
section 3(b) to be engaged the impugned acts must fall strictly within the words of the sub-
section and be classifiable as the exercise of a public "power" or "function" or "duty".72  
Thus, a purported citizen's arrest will in general fall outside the reach of section 3(b) 
because there is no general power of citizen's arrest, only a broad range of civil and 
criminal immunities in those situations in which a citizen's arrest is effected.73  But in those 
limited circumstances in which specific powers are given to a private citizen to effect an 
arrest (Crimes Act 1961, sections 315(2) and 317 — citizens called upon by a constable to 
lend assistance) then the Bill of Rights applies.74  The upshot was that in N's case even if 
the respondent's detention by store staff on suspicion of theft had been an arbitrary one, 
the guarantees in section 22 of the Bill of Rights would not have been relevant, because 
section 3(b) was not triggered — the arrest was wholly private conduct, not the exercise of 
a public power. 
(iv) Contract prisons 
The Penal Institutions Act 1954 (as amended) permits the use of private prisons to 
house inmates.  It is of great interest in terms of our analysis of section 3(b) of the Bill of 
Rights, that section 41E of the 1954 Act explicitly provides that in respect of contract penal 
institutions, the Bill of Rights applies.  Here we have Parliament underscoring the point 
that public identity/ownership is not the test under section 3(b), but rather public 
functionality is. 
  
71  R v H [1994] 2 NZLR 143, 147 (CA). 
72  R v N above n 24. 
73  See Part II of the Crimes Act 1961. 
74  R v N above n 23, 719. 
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(v) Private entities acting under licence 
The judgment of Cooke P in TV3 Network Ltd v Eveready New Zealand Ltd is also 
significant to the application of the Bill of Rights to private entities.75  There, it was argued 
that TV3, a private broadcaster, could be forced to publish corrective material upon the 
showing of actionable defamation.  Cooke P opined that section 14 of the Bill of Rights 
(freedom of expression, in particular the right to impart information) might well support a 
jurisdiction to compel retraction or rectification.  If it were, would the Bill of Rights apply 
against TV3?  On that issue, Cooke P stated: 
By section 3(b) the Bill of Rights applies to acts done by any person or body in the performance 
of any public function, power, or duty conferred or imposed on the person or body by or 
pursuant to law.  In this case it is admitted that [TV3] is a duly licensed television broadcaster 
under the Broadcasting Act 1989.  Certain responsibilities, including some relating to balance 
in controversial issues of public importance, fall on it under section 4 of that Act.   
His Honour concluded that the Bill of Rights might well support an order that 
corrective information be broadcast by TV3.   
Though somewhat oblique, Cooke P's judgment in the TV3 case seems to indicate that 
notwithstanding TV3's private ownership, its exercise of broadcasting functions pursuant 
to licence and its subjection to duties under section 4 of the Broadcasting Act made it 
subject to the Bill of Rights in relation to its broadcasting activities (that is those acts 
related to the performance of the power or function authorised by the licence).76  
Radich and Best caution that, "It is important to read these comments within the 
context of the case.  The mere fact that a television network or other body is licensed by 
statute would not be sufficient to render it subject to the BORA."77  I agree.  Just because I 
hold a driver's licence does not mean I perform a public function when I take a spin in my 
car.  However, in many cases licensing of private operators will reflect the existence of an 
underlying public function, power or duty.  Thus, licensing, though not determinative, 
will provide a useful indicium as to whether the Bill of Rights applies.  This could well 
have ramifications for a host of private utilities entities which operate under statutory 
licensing regimes, such as telephone services providers, power companies and so on.  
Perhaps also banks might be caught if regarded as performing a public function? 
(vi) Education 
  
75 TV3 Network Ltd v Eveready New Zealand Ltd [1993] 3 NZLR 435 (CA). 
76 See also Radich and Best, above n 15, 252. 
77  Radich and Best, above n 15, 252. 
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The education sector is another field in which the application of public law values 
through the Bill of Rights is likely to be situation-specific.  This is due to the mixed 
education delivery systems in place, and the diverse range of facilities offered by various 
educational institutions.   
In his interesting paper, "Biculturalism, Multiculturalism, the Bill of Rights and the 
School Curriculum"78  Paul Rishworth has, correctly in my view, concluded that state 
school (and integrated school) teachers, as well as state and integrated school boards of 
trustees are subject to the Bill of Rights through section 3(b).  However, Rishworth also 
concludes that teachers and managers of private schools, even those registered and 
inspected in terms of section 35A of the Education Act 1989, do not exercise a public 
function pursuant to law in terms of section 3(b):  "The state certainly inspects and 
registers them, but this does not in my view convert them to state institutions".79   
With respect, this view does not bear scrutiny — suggesting that an entity in order to 
be caught by section 3(b) has to amount to a state institution completely misses the point 
of the sub-section.  That provision is premised on the notion that you can preserve your 
formally private identity, yet in respect of all or many or a few of your activities, exercise 
public functions, powers or duties.  Thus, the enquiry is not whether you are in substance 
a state institution, but whether you perform public functions, powers, and so on.  
Moreover, Rishworth's approach falls into the trap of co-equating "public" and "state".  As 
emphasised above, the two may have significant common overlapping areas but they are 
not the same, and as a general proposition it can be asserted that the notion of "public" 
exceeds the boundaries of the notion of the "state".  In conclusion, then, Rishworth's view 
that private schools may not be converted into "state institutions" through the inspection 
and registration schemes may well be correct, but does not answer any question relevant 
to a section 3(b) analysis. 
Moreover, the registration and inspection scheme, seen in the context of a compulsory 
education scheme, must make private schools at least as "public" as a private broadcaster 
licenced under the Broadcasting Act 1989.  In light of the observations of Cooke P in TV3 it 
is more than arguable that section 3(b) catches private schools. 
Finally, it is hard to believe that the core nature of a service is altered by the fact of its 
delivery through the private, or the public, sector.80  If education provided by the state 
  
78  P Rishworth "Biculturalism, Multiculturalism, the Bill of Rights and the School Curriculum" in 
Legal Research Foundation Education and the Law in New Zealand (Legal Research Foundation, 
Auckland, 1993) ch 2, 18-20 ["The Bill of Rights and the School Curriculum"]. 
79  "The Bill of Rights and the School Curriculum" above n 78, 19. 
80  This general point is reinforced, in my view, by the treatment of contract penal institutions in the 
Penal Institutions Act 1954, s 41E.  As discussed in "The Bill of Rights and the School Curriculum" 
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school sector is a public function exercised pursuant to the Education Act 1989, what is so 
different about the education provided through private schools registered and inspected 
under the same Act so as to render it not-public?  This substantive issue is not addressed 
by Rishworth.81 
Again let me  reiterate a point made at the outset of the article – even if private 
registered schools are caught by section 3(b) of the Bill of Rights that does not mean that 
their admittedly special character would not be taken account of in determining the 
substantive impact of the Bill of Rights on their activities.  Section 3 is only a threshold 
question.  If the Bill of Rights applies it could well be argued, for example, that while a 
state school could not engage in "partisan" religious teaching, a private catholic school 
could.  But equally if it is improper for a state school to subject pupils to unreasonable 
searches contrary to section 21 of the Bill of Rights,82 it is hard to see why pupils at private 
registered schools receiving substantial state funding should not enjoy the same 
protections. 
As yet there is little by way of concrete case law on the application of section 3(b) to the 
education sector.  However, in M v Palmerston North Boys High School Goddard J had to 
consider whether a decision to expel a pupil of Palmerston North Boys High School 
(PNBHS) (admittedly a state school) from the boarding school (potentially leaving him as 
a day pupil) was amenable to Bill of Rights scrutiny.83  Her Honour concluded that the 
specific relationship between PNBHS and the plaintiffs in relation to boarding was "a private 
commercial arrangement", and not one which could be regarded as the exercise of a public 
function or power conferred by or pursuant to law.84  Whether this case is rightly decided 
may be open to doubt — in reaching her conclusion, Goddard J relied on the decision of 
Blanchard J in the Newsmonitor case which I have criticised earlier.  Moreover Her Honour 
failed to recognise that in many instances (for example rural state high schools) a pupil's 
attendance at school necessarily requires the provision of accommodation by the school — 
thus boarding services could well be regarded as a core function of state schools.  That 
                                                                                                                                                                 
above n 78, 19 such prisons have been made explicitly subject to the Bill of Rights, 
notwithstanding their private ownership/identity. 
81  However, identity can have significance in certain cases — no one is suggesting, for example, that 
a parent who home teaches as permitted by the Education Act is exercising a public function 
within the meaning of s 3(b) of the Bill of Rights, even though that home teaching is the substitute 
for state-provided/approved education. 
82  See the Report of the Commissioner for Children Re Strip Search at Hastings Boys High School [1990-
1992] 1 NZBORR 480, 495, 497. 
83  M v Palmerston North Boys High School above n 28. 
84  M v Palmerston North Boys High School above n 28, 533. 
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said, the obvious difficulty of the issue, apparent from Goddard J's judgment, underscores 
the complexity of the issues raised by section 3(b) and the substantial measure of 
uncertainty as to where public law ends and private law begins. 
 
(vii)  Is government control a prerequisite to triggering section 3(b)? 
In Alexander v Police a question arose as to whether the Bill of Rights applied to certain 
acts of ambulance officers of the Wellington Free Ambulance Service Inc done at the scene 
of a traffic accident.85  The Court of Appeal noted that the organisation is "independent" 
and could "not be seen as an arm of central or local Government."86  Furthermore, 
"notwithstanding its public role", nor the fact that it received funding from a variety of 
sources including the government's Health Funding Authority (HFA), the Court 
concluded (citing two Canadian authorities) that "in no way can it be said to be acting as 
an agent of or otherwise under governmental control or implementing a Government 
policy or programme".87  
With respect, this reasoning does not fit well with the terms of section 3, nor with the 
case law discussed above (none of which, it should be noted, was referred to by the Court).  
First, section 3 is not tied, on its terms, to the implementation of governmental policies or 
programmes; rather it captures public functions, duties and powers.  "Public" and 
"governmental" are not synonymous; the former is clearly broader than the latter.  Second, 
section 3(b) nowhere mentions concepts of "control", "agency", "independence", "arm of … 
government" or the like; it refers to public functions, duties and powers.  The importation 
of concepts not found in section 3(b) in order to restrict its application is improper.  And to 
many people, the provision of ambulance services is the performance of a public function 
— that is after all why the HFA pays for it.  Third, in light of the very different wording of 
the Canadian Charter (noted by both Elias J and the Court of Appeal in Lange v Atkinson)88 
it was improper to use Canadian case law to read down the scope of our section 3(b).  
Fourth, it could be equally said of TV3 that it is independent of government, is not an 
agent of government and does not implement governmental programmes or policies in its 
broadcast activities, yet the Court of Appeal had hinted that section 3(b) probably applied 
to its operations.  How does Alexander square with this? 
  
85  Alexander v Police (1998) 4 HRNZ 632 (CA). 
86  Alexander v Police above n 85, 637. 
87  Alexander v Police above n 85, 637. 
88  Discussed above n 36-39. 
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In conclusion, it is suggested that Alexander should not be regarded as correctly stating 
the law of New Zealand on section 3(b) coverage.  In an appropriate case it will require 
reassessment so as to ensure that the true purpose and language of section 3(b) is given 
effect to and that the confining notions of "control", "agency" and "implementation" are 
abandoned. 
III JUDICIAL REVIEW89 
A General Observations 
At the outset it is important to re-iterate the point that those cases which the courts 
refuse to allow to proceed by way of judicial review do not, by that reason alone, fall 
outside of the "public law" classification.  As noted in the introduction many traditional 
areas of private law such as torts, contract and equity now have significant fields in which 
public law considerations play an explicit role in determining liability.  A holding that a 
decision is not susceptible to judicial review only need mean/means that that procedure is 
inappropriate to the circumstances of the allegations made, not that the case is not a public 
law one.  In the same way as many Bill of Rights issues are raised without reliance on the 
judicial review procedure (for example section 344A Crimes Act applications; exclusion of 
evidence for breach of criminal procedure rights; suits for Baigent damages; and so on) so 
too many other public law issues can emerge outside of the judicial review arena.  
Nonetheless, the area of judicial review is a useful barometer of those issues which the 
courts feel are properly examined by reference to public law principles.  And as we shall 
see there have been important developments, pushing the boundaries between public and 
private. 
A second important point to affirm is that judicial review is available both under 
statute (Judicature Amendment Act 1972 (JAA) and Part VII High Court Rules) and at 
common law.  Hence, there need be no fixation on the existence of a statutory power — as 
we shall see judicial review at common law has evolved to the position where the exercise 
of public power will be the proper subject matter of public law review even absent a 
statutory power. 
Next, in New Zealand, it might be thought that the well-known and often artificial and 
sterile English judicial review debate over "public" and "private" is quite irrelevant.90  
  
89 See generally for a thoroughgoing treatment of the law and principles of judicial review in New 
Zealand, G D S Taylor Judicial Review A New Zealand Perspective (Butterworths, Wellington, 1991) 
(with supplement 1997). 
90  The seminal case is O'Reilly v Mackman [1983] 2 AC 237 (HL).  See for example P P Craig 
Administrative Law (3 ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1994) ch 15. 
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After all the generous definitions of "statutory power" and "statutory power of decision" in  
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the JAA ensure that even decisions taken contrary to the rules of an incorporated 
organisation are properly the subject matter of a review application under the Act.91   
Nonetheless the public/private distinction is still of significance.  Whether the case is 
properly analysed as a public law one or an essentially private law one may well affect the 
type and intensity of review applied.  Accordingly, this requires public lawyers and judges 
alike to determine criteria for establishing that the particular case is a public law one, with 
the consequences that may have for the content of the standards which will apply and the 
intensity of review which will be exacted.  In other words, there should be a focus on 
substance not form: just because the JAA applies does not mean that the case is a public 
law one and that public law type of review and intensity of review should apply. 
This may appear straightforward enough, but there are complications.  First, public 
lawyers have rediscovered the elemental truth that "'public power' and 'governmental 
power' are not co-extensive":92 public law is as much about the abuse of power which 
affects the public interest regardless of the identity of the person or body who has 
committed the impugned acts as it is about the regulation of the activities of public 
institutions and bodies in the performance of their activities.  In other words, determining 
whether a case is a public law one for the purposes of judicial review cannot be answered 
by the expedient of the identity of the actor.  Second, even if a case is a public law one the 
intensity of review is variable.  We should not be surprised therefore if on occasion the 
intensity of review to which a public body is subjected is less than that which prevails in a 
private law context.93 
B The Importance of the Nature of the Function 
1 The Datafin case 
That identity is not the determinative factor in deciding whether a case is a public law 
one or not was graphically illustrated by the important English Court of Appeal judgment 
in ex parte Datafin.94  There the applicant sought judicial review of a determination of the 
  
91 See Peters v Collinge [1993] 2 NZLR 554 (HC) and Naden v Judicial Committee of Auckland Racing 
Club (Inc) [1995] 1 NZLR 307 (CA).  If we look at the JAA, we can see that its wording is ample 
enough to catch the conduct of companies, incorporated and unincorporated bodies and so on (see 
s 3 definition of "person").  Moreover, while that "person" must exercise or purport to exercise a 
statutory power before the JAA applies, "statutory power" has also a very broad application, 
including any power conferred upon a "person" by legislation or under the constitution, rules or 
bylaws of a body corporate. 
92 D Mullan "Administrative Law at the Margins" in M Taggart (ed) The Province of Administrative 
Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 1997) 154. 
93 See to similar effect, Mullan,  above n 92, 153. 
94 Ex  parte Datafin [1987] 1 QB 815 (Eng CA). 
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Panel on Take-Overs and Mergers.  The Panel was an unincorporated association without 
legal personality made up of some dozen members appointed by and representing the 
clearing banks, investment trust companies, insurers, the stock exchanges, pension funds 
and so on.  It promulgated a code of conduct (the City Code on Take-overs and Mergers) 
intended to govern mergers and acquisitions; investigated and reported upon alleged 
breaches of the Code; and applied (or threatened to apply) indirect sanctions, such as 
public censure, referrals to private and public regulatory agencies and so on.  All of this 
was done "without visible means of legal support", but evidence demonstrated that the 
sanctions were "no less effective because they are applied indirectly and lack a legally 
enforceable base."95  Hence, although the Panel lacked "any authority de jure" it exercised 
"immense power de facto."96  The issue was whether the Panel was the proper subject of 
public law judicial review.  In holding that it was, the Court noted that: 
(1) the state, in framing a scheme for the control of takeovers and mergers, had 
decided to use the Panel as the central regulatory body and erect around it a 
periphery of statutory powers and penalties dependent on decisions made by the 
Panel; 
(2) the Panel operated wholly in the public domain; 
(3) the Panel's "jurisdiction" extended to all acquisitions and mergers and affected all 
persons, whether they were represented on the Panel or not; 
(4) the Panel "has a giant's strength"; 
(5) most equivalent institutions overseas were creatures of statute; 
(6) control by established forms of private law such as actionable combinations in 
restraint of trade and so on would not be in the least effective. 
As to underlying rationale, Sir John Donaldson MR opined that the real issue was 
whether the Panel in exercising such extensive de facto authority "is above the law".97  
Moreover, recalling the statutory scheme built around the Panel, His Lordship emphasised 
that in determining the jurisdictional issue courts must "recognise the realities of executive 
power" and must not allow "their vision to be clouded by the subtlety and sometimes 
complexity of the way in which it can be exerted."98  In rejecting the submission of counsel 
for the Panel that it was not subject to review because the source of any authority it had 
  
95 Ex parte Datafin above n 94, 824 and 826. 
96 Ex parte Datafin above n 94, 826. 
97 Ex parte Datafin above n 94, 827. 
98 Ex parte Datafin above n 94, 839. 
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was not to be found in statute or prerogative, Lloyd LJ (as he then was) emphasised that "it 
is not just the source of the power that matters, but also the nature of the duty."99 
It is important to emphasise however that in Datafin, having decided the jurisdictional 
issue against the Panel, the Court of Appeal proceeded to declaim any desire to interfere in 
much of the Panel's work.  The Court expressed a reluctance to quash an interpretative 
decision of the Panel, to question the vires of promulgated rules, and so on.  Indeed, in the 
later case of R v Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, ex parte Guinness plc,100 the Court of 
Appeal rejected a claim that the Panel's refusal to adjourn a hearing into the activities of 
Guinness plc was unlawful, even though the Panel's investigations could have been 
pursued more thoroughly.  While the decision not to adjourn was reviewable in principle, 
some latitude should be shown to the Panel's assessment of the relevant circumstances.  
This outcome reinforces the general point made previously that the threshold issue of 
determining susceptibility to public law does not dictate the intensity of review. 
2 Datafin's Progeny in England 
In subsequent cases in England and Wales plaintiffs have sought to use Datafin as the 
basis upon which to claim review of formally private institutions.  Many of these have 
been unsuccessful.101  Thus, in R v Disciplinary Committee of the Jockey Club, ex parte Aga 
Khan,102 the Court of Appeal held that the decision of the Jockey Club's Disciplinary 
Committee in relation to the disqualification of the applicant's horse was not susceptible to 
judicial review.  This was so even though it was acknowledged that the Club — a private 
organisation — regulated a national activity and an activity, moreover, which would be in 
all probability the subject of governmental regulation were it not for the existence of the 
Club.  In reaching its conclusion, the Court emphasised that the Club was not in its origin, 
constitution, membership or history a public body and that its powers were not 
governmental.  Similarly in R v Football Association, ex parte Football League Ltd,103 it was 
held that the Football Association (FA) was not subject to review à la Datafin.  Its 
monopolistic powers in relation to the organisation of soccer were not sustained in any 
way by a state agency; there was no real governmental interest in its functions; and there 
  
99 Ex parte Datafin above n 94, 848.  See also His Lordship's comments 846-847. 
100 R v Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, ex parte Guinness plc  [1990] 1 QB 146 (Eng CA). 
101 In addition to the cases mentioned in the text see also R v Lloyd's of London, ex parte Briggs [1993] 
COD 66.  For a successful invocation of Datafin, see R v Advertising Standards Authority, ex parte The 
Insurance Services plc [1990] COD 42. 
102 R v Disciplinary Committee of the Jockey Club, ex parte Aga Khan [1993] 2 All ER 853 (Eng CA). 
103 R v Football Association, ex parte Football League Ltd [1993] 2 All ER 833 (Eng HC). 
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was no evidence that absent the FA the state would feel a duty to establish a public body 
in its stead. 
One of the primary reasons for the reluctance to apply Datafin too readily is the 
awareness that while many private regulatory bodies do exercise power, indeed 
considerable power, over their area of operation such power does not necessarily equate to 
public power.  Hoffmann LJ (as he then was) expressed the point in Aga Khan as 
follows:104 
But the mere fact of power, even over a substantial area of economic activity, is not enough.  ...  
Private power may affect the public interest and the livelihoods of many individuals.  But that 
does not subject it to the rules of public law.  If control is needed it must be found in the law of 
contract, the doctrine of restraint of trade, [statute] and all the other instruments available for 
curbing the excesses of private power. 
3 The New Zealand approach: Electoral Commission v Cameron 
In New Zealand, a similar focus on function rather than character or identity was 
apparent in Electoral Commission v Cameron.105  There, the Court of Appeal had to 
determine whether a ruling of the Advertising Standards Complaints Board was subject to 
judicial review.  The Advertising Standards Authority Inc, a body corporate, had 
established under its rules the Complaints Board as an unincorporated body.  The purpose 
of the Board was to adjudicate upon complaints that advertisements prepared or 
published by member organisations breached the Advertising Codes of Practice which had 
been adopted by the Society.  In the instant case, the Board had found that advertisements 
published on behalf of the Electoral Commission breached the Codes of Practice.  The 
Commission disputed this finding and sought to review the Board's decision.   
The Court of Appeal speaking through Gault J readily concluded that section 4 of the 
JAA was triggered: the Board (a "person" for the purposes of section 3 JAA) was 
established under rules of an incorporated body (that is had a "statutory power" in terms 
of section 3 JAA).  Thus, the Court did not need to rely on its common law jurisdiction to 
subject the Board to review as the English Court in Datafin had had to do. 
But what type of review should the Board be subject to?  Gault J — in terms redolent of 
Datafin — emphasised the fact that "whether by contract or by industry practice, the Board 
exercises a regulatory function by which it determines what advertising is or is not 
  
104 R v Disciplinary Committee of the Jockey Club, ex parte Aga Khan above n 102, 875. 
105 Electoral Commission v Cameron [1997] 2 NZLR 421 (CA). 
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communicated to the public by substantially the whole of the media throughout the 
country".106  Later, His Honour remarked:107 
The board in carrying out its public regulatory role, though in accordance with powers 
conferred ... by a private organisation, must be regarded as exercising public power.  That will 
be reviewable on public law principles. 
Indeed, earlier he had noted that it would have been unfortunate if judicial review of 
the Board were not available, in light of the fact that non-member broadcasting 
organisations were subject to the jurisdiction of the Broadcasting Standards Authority — 
established by statute — the jurisdiction of which was undoubtedly subject to judicial 
review. 
Having determined the threshold application of the JAA, Gault J cautioned that,108 
Finding that decisions of the board are amenable to review still leaves for consideration the 
grounds upon which review may be granted.  Decisions of unincorporated bodies exercising 
public regulatory functions may not easily fall for examination on conventional grounds of 
illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety.  In appropriate cases a more flexible 
approach may be called for. 
His Honour went on to hold that a set of standards could be exacted of the Board 
different from that applicable to other bodies subject to public law review.  His Honour 
indicated a greater willingness to intervene on reasonableness grounds (by application of a 
standard lower than the Wednesbury test) and on grounds of encroachment upon statutory 
functions or powers conferred on public authorities.109 
C The Importance of the Actor's Public Character 
Having established that public character or identity is not the sole determinant by 
reference to which amenability to public law judicial review is decided, it seems important 
to affirm that in other cases that character or identity will be crucial to determining 
amenability to judicial review. 
In particular, the public character of the actor whose acts are sought to be impugned is 
highly relevant where the impugned act is non-public in nature, invariably relating to 
contracts entered into by the public body.  In Webster v Auckland Harbour Board,110 the 
  
106 Electoral Commission v Cameron above n 105, 424. 
107 Electoral Commission v Cameron above n 105, 433 (emphasis added). 
108 Electoral Commission v Cameron above n 105, 430. 
109 Electoral Commission v Cameron above n 105. 
110 Webster v Auckland Harbour Board [1983] NZLR 646 (CA). 
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applicants sought to judicially review (under the JAA) the Auckland Harbour Board's 
(AHB) decisions (a) to withdraw an offer to renew a foreshore licence and (b) to require 
removal of a boatshed and launching ramp constructed by the licensees.  The AHB 
submitted as a preliminary matter of law that judicial review did not extend to the 
decisions it had made as there was no exercise of statutory powers within the meaning of 
the JAA.  It submitted that its decisions amounted to the exercise of contractual and/or 
property rights which it enjoyed and could exercise on the same unfettered basis as all 
natural and legal persons.  The Court of Appeal disagreed.  In their joint judgment Cooke 
and Jeffries JJ emphasised that "even when exercising contractual powers a public 
authority is not in exactly the same position as a private citizen."  Their Honours 
continued:111 
Undoubtedly a public body which has, as here, lawfully entered into a contract is bound by it 
and has the same powers under it as any other contracting party.  But in exercising the 
contractual powers it may also be restricted by its public law responsibilities.  The result may 
be that a decision taken by the public body cannot be treated as purely in the realm of contract; 
it may be at the same time a decision governed to some extent by statute. 
While some later cases had suggested that Webster was a tentative statement of law,112 
its reasoning is reflected in the Privy Council's decision in Mercury Energy v ECNZ.113 
There, the Court of Appeal had rejected the proposition that ECNZ's decision to terminate 
an electricity supply contract with Mercury was susceptible to judicial review.  The Court 
reasoned that a supply contract was not a public act which was susceptible to judicial 
review.114  But the Privy Council took a different approach, establishing that judicial 
review was, in principle, available against a contractual act of an SOE.  Said Lord 
Templeman for the Board:115 
A state-owned enterprise is a public body; its shares are held by ministers who are responsible 
to the House of Representatives and accountable to the electorate.  The Corporation carries on 
its business in the interests of the public.  Decisions made in the public interest by the 
Corporation, a body established by statute, may adversely affect the rights and liabilities of 
private individuals without affording them any redress.  Their Lordships take the view that in 
these circumstances the decisions of the Corporation are in principle amenable to judicial 
  
111 Webster v Auckland Harbour Board above n 110, 650. 
112 See NZ Stock Exchange v Listed Companies Assn Inc [1984] 1 NZLR 699 (CA). 
113 Mercury Energy v ECNZ [1994] 2 NZLR 385 (PC). 
114 Mercury Energy v ECNZ [1994] 1 NZLR 551 (CA). 
115 Mercury Energy v ECNZ  above n 113, 388. 
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review both under the Act of 1972 [that is the Judicature Amendment Act 1972] as amended 
and under the common law. 
His Lordship continued by referring to judicial review as being "a judicial invention to 
secure that decisions are made by ... a public body according to law even if the decision 
does not otherwise involve an actionable wrong."116  Thus, it was ECNZ's public body 
status which made its contracts susceptible to review. 
However, while it cast a wide jurisdictional net, the Privy Council's decision should 
excite little concern among SOEs.117  This is because the grounds of review of an SOE's 
contracts are narrow.  Lord Templeman held that to be successful, unreasonableness in the 
Wednesbury sense would have to be demonstrated by the aggrieved party and that it 
would be unlikely that "a decision by a state-owned enterprise to enter into or determine a 
commercial contract to supply goods or services will ever be the subject of judicial review 
in the absence of fraud, corruption or bad faith."118  This narrow range of review was 
justified, in his Lordship's opinion, because of the availability of other mechanisms, 
judicial and non-judicial, to appropriately control the exercise of contracting powers.119   
On one view, the Privy Council's approach in Mercury is a case of giving with the one 
hand and taking with the other.  Indeed, Mai Chen has questioned whether the Privy 
Council decision "is really different in effect from that of the Court of Appeal".120  Radich 
  
116 Mercury Energy v ECNZ  above n 113, 388. 
117 See M Chen "Accountability of SOEs and Crown-owned Companies: Judicial Review, the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act and the Impact of MMP" [1994] NZLJ 296, 298 and Taggart, below  
n 118. 
118 This narrow set of grounds has been criticised in M Taggart "Corporatising, Contracting and the 
Courts" [1994] Public Law 351. 
119 To these reasons might be added those expressed in earlier New Zealand cases emphasising the 
competitive disadvantage which SOEs and other public bodies would operate under if  judicial 
review of their contractual arrangements was available.  As Blanchard J put it in NZ Private 
Hospitals Assn Auckland Branch Inc v Northern Region Health Authority (7 December 1994) 
unreported, High Court, Auckland Registry, CP440/94, 42, it would be  
[I]ntolerable if, in addition to rules of contract and other principles of the general law 
(including equity), a statutory body of this type, which is after all exercising a trading 
function, should also be subject to judicial review. ... Any trading organisation subjected 
to this requirement would be at a distinct competitive disadvantage. 
In light of Mercury, the way in which such an "intolerable" situation is to be dealt with is not by 
denying any possibility of review of the contractual and/or trading activities of statutory and 
other public bodies, but rather by only subjecting those activities to grounds of review which are 
appropriate in the circumstances. 
120 Chen above n 117, 298. 
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and Best, however, have argued that one ought not to read too much into Lord 
Templeman's restrictive statements of grounds for review.  They note that his statement 
reflects what is likely but does not rule out that in an appropriate case the unlikely could 
happen and a more rigorous review of decisions to enter or determine contracts occur, 
particularly where procedural impropriety or illegality is involved.121  Indeed, in his 
separate concurring judgment in the very recent Vector Ltd v Transpower, Thomas J 
expressed the view that Lord Templeman's statement should not be read as precluding 
challenges on grounds of illegality, improper purpose or motive, or discriminatory 
practices.122 
These cases illustrate the important point that determining that a case is a public law 
one does not determine the extent to which public law considerations will intrude.  
Whether a case is a public law one is merely a threshold issue.  The Mercury approach 
would seem to indicate preference for a reasonably low threshold, tempered by relatively 
narrow grounds of review in relation to some of the new matters which the wide 
jurisdiction brings before the courts.  Later decisions have not always appeared to fully 
understand this balance in Mercury.  In a number of cases the High Court would appear to 
have ruled out any jurisdiction to review a commercial contract entered into by a public 
body because of the supposed absence of a statutory power in making the contract.  While 
space constraints do not permit consideration of those cases,123 it is important to 
emphasise that insofar as they suggest that review is precluded by the commerciality of 
the decision involved, they are flawed.  As Richard Best states in an article in LawTalk, 
"Rationalising judicial review of commercial decisions",124 "'Commercial' should not 
automatically be equated with 'private' or 'not reviewable'." 
IV CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this paper has been to show that: 
(1) in particular, the broad application provisions in the Bill of Rights suggest that 
public law standards will be relevant to many aspects of both statutory and 
common law "private law"; 
  
121 P Radich and R Best "Maximising the Benefit from Administrative Law Litigation" AIC 
Administrative Law Summit, Wellington 17-18 April 1997, 12. 
122 Vector Ltd v Transpower [1999] 3 NZLR 646, 671, paras 85-6. 
123 They are considered at some length by Radich and Best, above n 15. 
124 Richard Best "Rationalising Judicial Review of Commercial Decisions" (October 1997) 487 LawTalk 
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(2) there is also the possibility that the ambit of certain "private law" concepts may 
have to be extended if there is to be compliance with the Bill of Rights (for 
example section 21 Bill of Rights may require the development of the tort of 
privacy); 
(3) though current jurisprudence has not really examined the issue, there is Canadian 
authority to support the view that if a broad interpretation is given to section 3(a) 
of the Bill of Rights, SOEs and other Crown entities could be subject to the Bill of 
Rights in relation to all acts which they do, from the performance of their public 
functions to internal matters; 
(4) there is confusion as to the applicability of the Bill of Rights to the commercial 
activities of SOEs and Crown entities under section 3(b), although the 
preponderance of authority indicates that such activities will be caught; 
(5) private entities will also be caught by the Bill of Rights to the extent that their 
activities involve the performance of public functions, duties or powers.  The 
extent to which the Bill of Rights applies to private businesses operating under 
licence is an open issue with substantial ramifications; 
(6) even in the traditional field of public law, judicial review, developments are 
apace which indicate the importance of the public nature of the function (as 
opposed to the public character of the entity) which is impugned in determining 
whether public law judicial review is available.  Recent case law indicates that the 
Courts are quite prepared to apply public law constraints to private entities 
where such entities are regarded as exercising public power or discharging public 
functions; 
(7) at the same time the case law establishes that the public status of a body is 
sufficient reason as to why its commercial decisions are in principle subject to 
judicial review, even if the grounds of review of such decisions are limited. 
In light of these propositions the broad conclusion can be drawn, and needs to be 
appreciated, that a "public law" case can arise in settings far removed from those 
traditionally thought of as "public law" ones.  Private lawyers of the future will need to 
have strong awareness of public law issues to practice effectively; but equally we public 
lawyers need to start extending our horizons and to become comfortable with the 
emerging reality of the considerable substantive interaction between public and private 
law. 
 
